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Abstract
This paper uses variation in access to a targeted lending program to estimate whether
firms are credit constrained. The basic idea is that while both constrained and unconstrained
firms may be willing to absorb all the directed credit that they can get (because it may be
cheaper than other sources of credit), constrained firms will use it to expand production,
while unconstrained firms will primarily use it as a substitute for other borrowing. We apply
these observations to firms in India that became eligible for directed credit as a result, of a
policy change in 1998, and lost eligibility as a result of the reversal of this reform in 2000.
Using firms that were already getting this kind of credit before 1998, and retained eligibility
in 2000 to control for time trends, we show that there is no evidence that directed credit is
being used as a substitute for other forms of credit. Instead the credit was used to finance
more production-there was a large acceleration in the rate of growth of sales and profits for
these firms. We conclude that many of the firms must have been severely credit constrained,
and that the marginal rate of return to capital was very high for these firms. Keywords:
Banking, Credit constraints, India JEL: 016, G2
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1 Introduction
That there are limits to credit access is widely accepted today as an important part of an
economist's description of the world. Credit constraints figure prominently in economic analyzes
of short-term fluctuations and long-term growth. 1 Yet there is still little tight evidence of the
existence of credit constraints on larger firms in developing countries. While there is evidence of
credit constraints in rural settings in developing countries, 2 except in the very poorest countries,
the share of agriculture in the capital stock is not large enough for the credit constraints to have
quantitatively large effects: in India, the share of agriculture in output is 24% and its share
in the capital stock is even smaller. Moreover, in Banerjee and Duflo (2005), we argue that
it is not enough to show that the very smallest firms are credit constrained, since while they
are numerous, the share of capital in these firms is too small to have much power in terms of
explaining the cross-country productivity differences. On the other hand, if it is the medium-
sized firms that are constrained, the productivity loss due to the missallocation of capital caused
by credit constraints may be potentially very large: indeed, we argue that it may be large enough
to explain the entire productivity gap between India and the US.
Prima facie, the idea that such firms may be severely constrained is certainly consistent with
the available evidence. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) survey evidence from many less developed
countries, showing that borrowing interest rates are often of the order of 60% or above, even
though deposit rates are less than half as much, and defaults are rare. This suggests that the
marginal product of capital in the firms paying these rates might far exceed the opportunity
cost of capital. However this evidence is only partly convincing: the problem is that we do not
know whether the firms that pay these rates are somehow atypical (smaller, more desperate,
irrational). 3
1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) on theories of business cycles based on credit
constraints and Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) on theories of growth and development
based on limited credit access.
The estimation of the effects of credit constraints on farmers is significantly more straightforward since
variations in the weather provide a powerful source of exogeneous short-term variation in cash flow. Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993) use this strategy to study the effect of credit constraints on investment in bullocks in rural
India.
3Although it is worth saying that the studies from which these interest rate numbers come concern normal
There is also some direct evidence on rate of returns on capital. McKenzie and Woodruff
(2004) estimate parametric and non-parametric relationships between firm earnings and firm
capital. Their estimates suggest huge returns to capital for these small firms: for firms with
less than $200 invested, the rate of return reaches 15% per month, well above the informal
interest rates available in pawn shops or through micro-credit programs (on the order of 3% per
month). These regressions may suffer from of an "ability bias" caused by a correlation between
investment level and rates of return to capital (Olley and Pakes (1996)). To address this issue,
De Mel, Mckenzie and Woodruff (2006) randomly allocate small ($200 or so) capital grants to
microenterprises in Sri Lanka, and find that the returns to capital are also very high for those
firms: the average returns to capital is as high as 4% per month.
These firms are, however, very small and unconnected to any bank. Unfortunately, it difficult
to imagine carrying out the same experiment for larger firms that are already connected to the
banking sector. Thus, in this paper, we take advantage of a natural experiment to estimate the
effect of an influx of credit on investment and productivity of medium-sized firms in India. 4 We
make use of a policy change that affected the flow of directed credit to an identifiable subset of
firms. Such policies and policy changes are common in many developing and developed countries.
What makes this case particularly interesting is that the firms affected by the policy are officially
registered firme (this means that they are not part of the informal economy, although none of
these firms are listed on the stock market), fairly large by Indian standards, though not the
largest corporate entities: the average capital stock of firms in the 95th percentile in the median
industry in India was Rs. 36 million (the exchange rate was about 45 rupees to a dollar), which
puts them at a size just above the category of firms that were affected by the policy change
(which required a capital stock between Rs. 6.5 and Rs. 30 million).
The advantage of our approach is that it gives us a specific exogenous shock to the supply
of credit to specific firms. Its disadvantage is that directed credit need not be priced at its true
market price. This has two important, implications: First, firms will want directed credit even
if they are not credit constrained simply because it is a cheaper substitute for market credit.
production loans to stable firms, not emergency loans.
4The approach of looking directly at an identifiable shock to credit supply for a specific subgroup is similar in
spirit to that in Peek and Rosengren (2000), who look at the impact of a reduction in credit at U.S. subsidiaries
of Japanese banks during the Japanese banking crisis on real estate activity in the U.S.
Therefore the fact that a firm is willing to borrow more at the same price when more is offered
to them, cannot be seen as evidence that they are credit constrained it is rationed with respect
to this particular source of cheap credit, but not necessarily credit constrained. Second, and
more troublingly, a shock to the supply of directed credit might lead not just to more borrowing
but also to more investment even if a firm is not credit constrained.
In the theoretical section of this paper we develop a simple methodology based on ideas
from price theory that allows us to deal with the inference problem suggested in the previous
paragraph. The methodology is based on two observations: first, if a firm is not credit con-
strained, then an increase in the supply of subsidized directed credit to the firm must lead it to
substitute directed credit for credit from the market. Second, while investment, and therefore
total production, may go up even if the firm is not credit constrained, it will only go up if the
firm has already fully substituted market credit with directed credit.
We test these implications using firm-level data we collected from a sample of medium size
firms in India. We make use of a change in the so-called "priority sector" regulation, under
which firms smaller than a certain limit are given priority access to bank lending. 5 The first
experiment we exploit is a 1998 reform which increased the maximum size below which a firm is
eligible to receive priority sector lending (from Rs. 6.5 to Rs. 30 Million). Our basic empirical
strategy is a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach: that is, we focus on the changes in
the rate of change in various firm outcomes before and after the reform for firms that were
included in the priority sector as a result of the new limit, using the corresponding changes
for firms that were already in the priority sector as a control. We find that bank lending and
firm revenues went up for the newly targeted firms in the year of the reform, relative to firms
that were already included. We find no evidence that this was accompanied by substitution of
bank credit for borrowing from the market and no evidence that revenue growth was confined
to firms that had fully substituted bank credit for market borrowing. As argued earlier, the
last two observations are inconsistent with firms being unconstrained in their market borrowing.
Our second experiment uses the fact that a large fraction of these firms (specifically those with
investments higher than Rs. 10 million) that were included in the priority sector in 1998, got
5 Banks are penalized for failing to lend a certain fraction of the portfolio to firms classified in the priority
sector.
excluded again in 2000. We find that bank lending and firm revenues went down for these firms,
both compared to the firms that had always been a part of the priority sector and to firms that
were included in 1998, and remained part of the priority sector in 2000. Moreover because we
have two separate experiments that each allow us to estimate the effects on credit and revenue
growth, we can implement an overidentification test which essentially ask whether the effect of
credit on revenue is the same in the two cases. The results easily pass this test, making it much
less likely that the effects are generated by differential time trends in the productivity of small,
medium and large firms: for that to be the explanation for what we find, the productivity trends
would have to have reversed in exactly the right way at exactly the right time.
We also use this data to estimate parameters of the production function. We estimate an
elasticity of sales with respect to bank credit of 0.75. This ought to be a lower bound on the
elasticity of sales with respect to working capital (since bank loans are only a part of working
capital, we would expect working capital not to go up in the same proportion as bank loans
when bank loans go up as a result of the policy shock). We will argue that if there is any
substitution of market borrowing for bank borrowing, given what we know about the share of
bank loans in total working capital, the elasticity of sales with respect to total working capital
must be well above 1. This would imply that firms have increasing returns in the neighborhood
of their current level of investment, and therefore must be credit constrained (otherwise they
would keep borrowing).
Finally, we try to estimate the effect of the program-induced additional investment on profits.
While the interpretation of this result relies on some additional assumptions, it suggests a very
large gap between the marginal product and the interest rate paid on the marginal dollar (the
point estimate is that Rs. 1 more in loans increased profits net of interest payments by Rs. 0.73,
which is much too large to be explained as just the effect of getting a subsidized loan).
These very high estimates for the elasticities make it particularly important to understand
how the extra credit that the program generated was allocated. In the second part of the
theoretical section we therefore study the allocation problem faced by a loan officer who is
rewarded for lending more but are also punished for defaults. We show that this creates an
incentive for targeting credit (a) towards firms that are the least likely to default which may
also be some of the more profitable firms, but also (b) towards firms that are on the brink of
default and therefore need to be bailed out. As a result, an OLS regression of revenue (or
profitability) on credit growth may be biased downwards or upwards by selection. On the other
hand, when the loan officer gets an unexpected inflow of additional loanable funds, he would
want to give all of that to the firms that are least likely to default, since the set of firms that
need to be bailed out remains unchanged and he was already taking care of those firms before
the inflow of extra credit. Assuming that the firms that are the least likely to default are also
among the most productive firms, we should therefore expect to see the instrumental variables
estimate of the effect of credit growth on revenue growth to be much stronger than the OLS
estimate, when the source of the variation is a program like the one we are studying. 6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the institutional
environment and our data sources, provides some descriptive evidence, and informally argues
that firms may be expected to be credit constrained in this environment. The following section
develops the theory that justifies our empirical strategy, and provides some useful insights for
interpreting what we find. The next section develops the equations we estimate. The penultimate
section reports the results. We conclude with some admittedly speculative discussion of what
our results imply for credit policy in India.
2 Institutions, Data and Some Descriptive Evidence
2.1 The Banking Sector in India
Despite the emergence of a number of dynamic private sector banks and entry by a large number
of foreign banks, the biggest banks in India are all in the public sector, i.e., they are corporatized
banks with the government as the controlling share-holder. In 2000 the 27 public sector banks
collected over 77% of deposits and comprised over 90% of all branches.
The particular bank we study is a public sector bank, generally considered to be a good
bank. 7
While banks in India occasionally provide longer-term loans, financing fixed capital is primar-
ily the responsibility of specialized long-term lending institutions such as the Industrial Finance
6Note that we are still consistently estimating a causal effect of the extra credit with this experiment, but this
is the effect on the extra credit on good firms, which are the ones affected by the reform.
'It is consistently rated among the top five public sector banks by Business Today, a major business magazine.
Corporation of India. Banks typically provide short-term working capital to firms. These loans
are given as a credit line with a pre-specifled limit and an interest rate that is set a few percent-
age points above prime. The borrower draws from the limit when needed, and reimburses on a
quarterly basis. This paper therefore estimates the impact of short term capital loans, not that
of long term investment credit; moreover, it focuses on the working capital limit (which is the
amount of working capital financing available to the firm at any point).
The spread between the interest rate and the prime rate is fixed in advance based on the
firm's credit rating and other characteristics, but cannot be more than 4%. Credit lines in India
charge interest only on the part that is used and, given that the interest rate is pre-specified,
many borrowers want as large a credit line as they can get.
2.2 Priority Sector Regulation
All banks (public and private) are required to lend at least 40% of their net credit to the "priority
sector", which includes agriculture, agricultural processing, transport industry, and small scale
industry (SSI). If banks do not satisfy the priority sector target, they are required to lend money
to specific government agencies at very low rates of interest.
In January 1998, there was a change in the definition of the small scale industry sector.
Before this date only firms with total investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million
were included. The reform extended the definition to include firms with investment in plants
and machinery up to Rs. 30 million. In January 2000, the reform was partially undone by a
new change: firms with investment in plants and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30
million were excluded from the priority sector.
The priority sector targets seems to have been binding for the bank we study (as well as for
most banks): every year, the bank's share lent to the priority sector is very close to 40% (it
was 42% in 2000-2001). It is plausible that the bank had to go some distance down the client
quality ladder to achieve this target. Moreover, there is the issue of the administrative cost of
lending. Banerjee and Duflo (2000), calculated that, for four Indian public banks, the labor and
administrative costs associated with lending to the priority sector were about 1.5 higher per
rupees than that of lending in the unreserved sector. This is consistent with the common view
that lending to smaller clients is more costly.
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With the reform, we thus expect an increase in lending to the larger firms newly included
in the priority sector, possibly at the expense of the smaller firms. When firms with investment
in plant and machinery above 10 million were excluded again from the priority sector, loans to
these firms no longer counted towards the priority sector target. The bank had to go back to
the smaller clients to fulfill its priority sector obligation. One therefore expects that loans to
those firms declined relative to the smaller firms. We focus on the comparison between larger
firms and smaller firms, and evaluate whether any relative change in loans between these groups
was matched by a corresponding change in sales and revenue.
2.3 Data Collection
The bank we study, like other public sector banks, routinely collects balance sheets and profit
and loss account data from all firms that borrow from it and compiles the data in the firm's
loan folder. Every year the firm also must apply for renewal/extension of its credit line, and
the paper-work for this is also stored in the folder, along with the firm's initial application even
when there is no formal review of the file. The folder is typically stored in the branch until it is
physically impossible to put more documents in it.
With the help of employees from this bank and a former bank officer, we first extracted
data from the loan folders from the clients of the bank in the spring of 2000. We collected
general information about the client (product description, investment in plant and machinery,
date of incorporation of units, length or the relationship with the bank, current limits for term
loans, working capital, and letter of credit). We also recorded a summary of the balance sheet
and profit and loss information collected by the bank, as well as information about the bank's
decision regarding the amount of credit to extend to the firm and the interest rate it charges.
As we discuss in more detail below, part of our empirical strategy called for a comparison
between accounts that have always been a part of the priority sector and accounts that became
part of the priority sector in 1998, and the sample was selected with this in mind. We first
selected all the branches that primarily handle business accounts in the six major regions of the
bank's operation (including New Delhi and Mumbai). In each of these branches, we collected
information on all the accounts of the clients of the bank of firms which, as of 1998, had
investment in plant and machinery below 30 million Rupees. This gave us a total of 249 firms,
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including 93 firms with investment in plants and machinery between 6.5 and 30 million rupees.
We aimed to collect data for the years 1996-1999, but when a folder is full, older information is
not always kept in the branch, so that old data gets "lost". Moreover, in some years, data is
not collected for some firms. We have data on lending from 1996 for 120 accounts (of the 166
firms that had started their relationship with the banks by 1996), 1997 data for 175 accounts
(of 191 possible accounts), 1998 data for 217 accounts (of 238) , and 1999 data for 213 accounts.
In the winter 2002-2003, we collected a new wave of data on the same firms in order to study
the impact of the priority sector contraction on loans, sales and profit. We have 2000 data for
175 accounts, 2001 data for 163 accounts, and 2002 data for 124 accounts.
There are two reasons why we have less data in 2000, 2001 and 2002 than in 1999. First,
that some firms had not had their 2002 review when we re-surveyed them in late 2002. Second,
43 accounts were closed between 2000 and 2002. The proportion of accounts closed is balanced:
it is 15% among firms with investment in plant and machinery above 10 million, 20% among
firms with investment in plant and machinery between 6.5 and 10 million, and 20% among firms
with investment in plant and machinery below 6.5 million. Thus, it does not appear that there
sample selection bias would emerge from the closing of those accounts. 8
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all data be used in the analysis of credit constraint
and credit rationing (in the full sample, and in the sample for which we have information on the
change in lending between the previous period and that period, which is the sample of interest
for the analysis).
2.4 Descriptive Evidence on Lending Decisions
In this subsection, we provide some description of lending decisions in the banking sector. We use
this evidence to argue that this is an environment where credit constraints arise quite naturally.
Tables 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics regarding the loans in the sample. The first row
of table 2 shows that, in a majority of cases, the working capital limit that the bank makes
The reason why we do not observe attrition in the 1998-1999 period is because our data for that period was
collected retrospectively in 2000: to be in our data set, an account had to still be in existence in 1999. This
implies that our sample only represents the survivor as of 1999. However, given that attrition is not differential
in response to second reform in 2000, there is again little concern that this sample selection biases the results.
available to the firm does not change from year to year: in 1999, the limit was not updated
even in nominal terms for 65% of the loans. This is not because the limit is set so high that
it is essentially non-binding: row 2 shows that in the six years in the sample, 63% to 80% of
the accounts reached or exceeded the credit limit at least once in the year: this means that the
borrower had drawn more from the limit in the course of a quarter than was available in the
credit limit.
This lack of growth in the credit limit granted by the bank is particularly striking given that
the Indian economy registered nominal growth rates of over 12% per year. This would suggest
that the demand for bank credit should have increased from year to year over the period, unless
the firms have increasing access to another source of finance. There is no evidence that they were
using any other formal source of credit. On average 98% of the working capital loans provided
to firms in bur sample come from this one bank and in any case, the same kind of inertia shows
up in the data on total bank loans to the firm. Indeed, sales have increased from year to year for
most firms (row 2), as did the maximum authorized lending (a function of projected sales). Yet
there was no corresponding change in lending from the bank. In fact the change in the credit
limit that was actually sanctioned systematically fell short of what the bank determined to be
the firm's needs as determined by the bank itself. On average, the granted limit was 89% of the
recommended limit.
It is possible that some of the shortfall was covered by informal credit, including trade credit:
according to the balance sheet, total current liabilities excluding bank credit increased by 3.8%
every year on average. However, some expenses (such as wages) are typically not covered by
trade credit and, moreover, trade credit, could be rationed as well. The question that is at the
heart of this paper is whether such substitution operates to the point where a firm is not credit
constrained.
In table 3, we examine in more detail whether this tendency could be explained by other
factors that might have affected a firm's need for credit. Column (3) shows that no variable
we observe seems to explain why a firm's credit limit was changed: firms were not more likely
to get an increase in limit if they had hit the limit in the previous year, if their projected
sales (according to the bank itself) or their current sales had gone up, if their ratio of profits
to sales had risen, or if their current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, a
standard indicator, in India as well as in the US, of how secure a working capital loan is) had
increased. Turning to the direction or the magnitude of changes, only an increase in projected
sales or current sales predicts an increase in granted limit, and only an increase in projected
sales predict the level of increase. This last result could well be due to reverse causality, however:
the bank officers appear to be more likely to predict an increase in sales when he is preparing
to give a larger credit extension to the firm.
Columns 5 and 6 in table 3 repeat the analysis, breaking the sample into recent and older
clients. Changes in limits are more frequent for younger clients, but they do not seem to be
more sensitive to past utilization, increases in projected sales, or profits. This suggest that the
lack of information to new signal may not reflect that all the relevant information about the
firm was already incorporated in the lending decisions.
3 Theory: the demand and supply of bank credit
Motivated by this evidence, the goal of this section is to develop some intuition about the
demand and supply of subsidized bank credit. The sub-section on demand sketches the choice
problem faced by a firm that has (limited) access to cheap bank credit but can also borrow from
the market at a higher rate. We are interested in how increased access to cheap bank credit
affects the market borrowing of the firm as well as its revenues and profits. We contrast its
reaction in the case where it has unlimited access to market credit at a fixed rate with the case
where it is constrained in its access to market credit.
The sub-section on supply then tries to understand the allocation of subsidized bank credit
among users who all want it. In particular we analyze the incentives facing a loan officer and
the choices he will make. This will provide a framework to interpret our findings.
3.1 The demand side: the key to identifying credit constraints
Consider a firm with the following fairly standard production technology: the firm must pay
a fixed cost C before starting production (say the cost of setting up a factory and installing
machinery). The firm then invests in labor and other variable inputs, k rupees of working
capital invested in variable inputs, yield R = f(k) rupees of revenue after a suitable period.
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f(k) has the usual shape—it is increasing and concave.
As mentioned above, the interesting case is where the firm has access to both low cost bank
credit and more expensive credit from other sources. We will say that a firm is credit rationed
with respect to a particular lender if there is no interest rate r such that the amount the firm
wants to borrow at that rate is strictly positive and equal to an amount that the lender is willing
to lend at that rate. Essentially this says that the supply curve of loans from that lender to
the firm is not horizontal at some fixed interest rate.
We will say the firm is credit constrained if there is no interest rate r such that the amount
that the firm wants to borrow at that rate is equal to an amount that all the lenders taken
together are willing to lend at that rate. This says that the aggregate supply curve of capital to
the firm is not horizontal at some fixed interest rate.
Note that a firm could be credit rationed with respect to every lender without being credit
constrained in our sense. This can be the case, for example, when there is an infinite supply of
lenders, each willing to lend to no more than $10 at an interest rate of 10%.
We can get all the relevant intuition from the simple case where there are only two lenders,
which we will call the "market" and the "bank" . Denote the market rate of interest by rm and
the interest rate that the bank charges by r^. Given that the bank is statutorily required to lend
a certain amount to the priority sector, there is reason to believe that the bank would have to
set a rate that is below the market rate: r^ <rm .
The policy change we analyze involves the firms in question being offered additional bank
credit, for the purpose of working capital investment. We will show in the next section that
there was no corresponding change in the interest rate. To the extent that firms accepted the
additional credit being offered to them, this is direct evidence of credit rationing with respect
to the bank. However this in itself does not imply that they would have borrowed more at the
market interest rate. A possible scenario is depicted in figure 1. The horizontal axis in the figure
measures k while the vertical axis represents output. The downward sloping curve in the figure
represents the marginal product of capital, f'(k). The step function represents the supply of
capital. In the case represented in the figure, we assume that the firm has access to fcbo units of
The amount the firm wants to borrow at a given rate is assumed to be an amount that would maximize the
firm's profit if it could borrow as much (or as little) as it wants at that rate.
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capital at the bank rate ri, but was free to borrow as much as it wanted at the higher market
rate rm . As a result, it borrowed additional resources at the market rate until the point where
the marginal product of capital is equal to rm . Its total outlay in this equilibrium is fcrj. Now
consider what happens if the firm is now allowed to borrow a greater amount, kbi, at the bank
rate. Since at kbi the marginal product of capital is higher than r;,, the firm will borrow the
entire additional amount offered to it. Moreover it will continue to borrow at the market interest
rate, though the amount is now reduced. The total outlay however is unchanged at fen. This
will remain the case as long as kbi < ko- The effect of the policy will be to substitute market
borrowing by bank loans. The firm's profits will go up because of the additional subsidies but
its total outlay and output will remain unchanged.
The expansion of bank credit will have output effects in this setting if kbi > ko . In this case
the firm will stop borrowing from the market and the marginal cost of credit it faces will be
Tb- It will borrow as much it can get from the bank but no more than fc^, the point where the
marginal product of capital is equal to Tb- We summarize these arguments in:
Result 1: If the firm is not credit constrained (i.e., it can borrow as much as it wants at
the market rate), but is rationed for bank loans, an expansion of the availability of bank credit
should always lead to a fall in its borrowing from the market as long as r^ < rm . Profits will
also go up as long as market borrowing falls. However the firm's total outlay and output will go
up only if the priority sector credit fully substitutes for its market borrowing. If rj, — rm , the
expansion of the availability of bank credit will have no effect on outlay, output or profits.
We contrast this with the scenario in figure 2, where the assumption is that the firm is
rationed in both markets and is therefore credit constrained. In the initial situation the firm
borrows the maximum possible amount from the banks (fc(,o) and supplements it with borrowing
the maximum possible amount from the market, for a total investment of ko. Available credit
from the bank then goes up to kbi This has no effect on market borrowing (since the total outlay
is still less than what the firm would like at the rate rm ) and therefore total outlay expands to
k\. There is a corresponding expansion of output and profits. 10
Result 2: If the firm is credit constrained, an expansion of the availability of bank credit
10 Of course, if kv \ were so large that F'(kp i) < rm , then there would be substitution of market borrowing in
this case as well.
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will lead to an increase in its total outlay, output and profits, without any change in market
borrowing.
We have assumed a particularly simple form of the credit constraint. However, both results
hold if instead of the strict rationing we have assumed here the firms face an upward supply
curve for bank credit. The result also holds if there are more than two lenders, as long we
interpret it to be telling us what happens to the more expensive sources of credit when the
supply of cheap credit is expanded.
The fact that the supply curve of market credit is drawn as a horizontal line in figure 2 is
also not important—what is important is that the supply curve of market credit in this figure
eventually becomes vertical. More generally, the key distinction between figure 1 and figure 2
is that in figure 1, the supply curve of market credit is always horizontal (which is why the
firm is unconstrained) while in figure 2, the supply curve slopes up (which is why the firm is
constrained).
The results also go through if the market supply curve of credit is itself a function of bank
credit (for example because bank credit serves as collateral for market credit). In this case, there
might be an increase in market borrowing as the result of the reform but this should be counted
as a part of the effect of the reform.
One case where these results fail is when the firm can borrow as much as it wants from the
market but not as little as it wants (because it wants to keep an ongoing credit relationship
with this source). If the minimum market borrowing constraint takes the form of a minimum
share of total borrowing that has to be from the market and this constraint binds, a firm will
respond to the availability of extra bank credit by also borrowing more from the market, in order
to maintain the required minimum share of market borrowing. In this case, our result 1 will
fail. However as long as there are some firms that are not at this constraint, there will be some
substitution of bank credit for market credit. Therefore the direct test of substitution, proposed
below, would apply even in this case, as long as the minimum market borrowing constraint does
not bind for all the firms.
Another case where the results would fail is if the firm were not making a marginal choice: If
the firm was choosing whether to shut down or not, and there was a fixed cost of operating the
business, the availability of additional subsidized credit might be decisive and in this case, the
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effect of subsidized credit on sales would be positive even if the firm were unconstrained in the
credit market and had not fully substituted its market borrowing. Similarly a certain number
of unconstrained firms would shut down when deprived of their access to subsidized credit.
This can be addressed by looking at what happened to the firms that were in our sample in
2000, when the subsidy they were getting were removed. We observe in the sub-section on data
collection, there is no systematic difference in exit rates between large and small firms in the
2000-2002 period. Indeed, rather surprisingly, attrition is actually slightly lower for bigger firms
in this period. This gives us some confidence that the results we show below are not driven by
exit resulting from the withdrawal of the subsidy.
i
3.2 The supply side: understanding lending behavior in Indian Banks
The analysis of the supply side will help us build some intuition about how to interpret the
empirical results. In particular we want to understand how subsidized bank loans will be allo-
cated to firms before and after the reform. Which types of firms tend to get more credit before
the reform? How is the new credit allocated to firms after the reform? Are some firms getting
more credit or are more firms getting credit? Are the better firms or the worst firms getting the
marginal credit? Portfolio allocation by credit officers in a bureaucratic settings is potentially a
complicated problem which we are studying in some parallel research (Banerjee, Cole and Duflo,
2008). Here jve focus on an extremely simplified illustrative example, which provides some hints
to what we might learn from a more general analysis of this problem.
The model is intended to capture a very simple intuition: The two performance measures
for loan officers that are most easily observed are the volume of his lending and whether the
loans got repaid. In a large bank, and especially in the highly bureaucratic Indian public sector
banks, this is probably all that the bank can use to give the loan officer incentives. In other
words, the only features of firm performance that the loan officer cares about is their willingness
to borrow and their likelihood of default. At some level this is also what the bank cares about:
The problem is that it does not observe the ex ante likelihood of default but only the ex post
fact that there has been default. This introduces a wedge between the incentives of the loan
officer and the incentives that the bank would have liked him to have had, which leads the loan
officer to bail out failing firms, whereas the bank would have preferred them to fail.
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3.2.1 A simple model of loan allocation
We start from the model in the previous section. However in order to focus on the issue at
hand we make a couple of additional simplifying assumptions. First, we set rt, the subsidized
interest rate charged by the bank, equal to zero. This simply makes the expressions less ugly.
Second, since we find that the firms are indeed credit constrained, we ignore market lending in
everything we do. If every firm started with a fixed amount of market credit (instead of zero)
but were still credit constrained, all our main conclusions would continue to hold.
Where we complicate the model is by introducing the idea that firms come in two types,
H and L, in fractions po and 1 - pq. The production function f(k) of the previous section
should now be interpreted as an expected production function (given that firms are risk neutral,
this change does not affect the analysis in the previous sub-section). For a firm of type H , the
probability of success is 1, and correspondingly, for type L is pi < 1. When a firm (of either
type) succeeds it gets f(k). Otherwise it gets 0. Assume as before that f(k) is strictly concave.
Each firm lives for 2 periods and there is no discounting between periods. At the end of
the second period the firm shuts down. We assume that the firm's probability of success is
independent across the periods. Firms do not deliberately default, but if they get they cannot
pay (they start with zero and do not retain earnings).
Lending on behalf of the bank is by decided upon by loan officers. Each loan officer's tenure
is also 2 periods and once again, there is no discounting between periods. Loan officers are given
incentives to lend out money, and to avoid default. Specifically, each loan officer starts his job
with a population of size 1 of new firms assigned to him and is supposed to lend 1 unit to each
new borrower. In the second period he is given a portfolio of size 1 + g and is free to chose how
to allocate it (since at this point, he has more information than the bank). Each unit that is
unlent costs, the banker an amount C.
The loan officer is penalized for any loan where there is a default. This punishment is F
per unit of default. 11 This assumption is a part of the reason why there are bailouts-it says
nWhen a loan in an Indian public sector bank (like bank we study) becomes non performing, it triggers the
possibility of an investigation by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the government body entrusted with
monitoring the probity of public officials. The CVC is formally notified of every instance of a bad loan in a public
sector bank, and investigates a fraction of them. There were 1380 investigations of bank officers in 2000 for credit
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that the punishment is linear in the size of the default. Since bailouts are a way to substitute
a probability of bigger future default for the certainty of a smaller current default, making the
penalty convex enough in the size of the default would discourage bailouts. We justify this
assumption with the usual convenience argument for linear incentives schemes. In real world
settings, the size of the first period loan presumably depends on a range of factors that have
to do with the industry that the firm is in, the interest rate in the market, the firm's access to
other sources of credit etc. For each such firm type, the optimal incentives for the loan officer
would require the penalty for default to be convex over a different range. Since the penalty is
ultimately bounded, it cannot be globally convex—it must therefore also be concave over other
ranges. Linear incentive schemes avoid the need to get these specific details exactly right for a
large number of firms types, which makes them attractive in large bureaucracies.
In the first period neither the loan officer nor the borrower knows the borrower's type; i.e.
each borrower is a random draw from the population. At the end of the first period, if the
borrower has failed it is common knowledge between the borrower and the lender that he is a
type L. If he is successful then with probability it both the lender and the borrower get a signal
that the borrower is a type H . With probability 1 — 7r, all that they know is that he did not fail,
which makes him a type H with probability p\ = +p P0(i^ p \ > Po.We call the firms on which
the loan officer gets no signal the type U firms.
In analyzing this model we will focus on the case where firms in both periods are willing to
take the loans that they get offered (the exact condition for this is given below). Therefore the
loan officer is the one who has to decide how to allocate the available capital. In the first period
the loan officer has no discretion-he has to give 1 unit to each borrower. We are studying the
allocation problem the loan officer faces in period 2, when he has information that the bank
does not have and has the discretion to use it.
3.2.2 Analysis of lending decisions
Given that there is a large population of borrowers we know that at the end of the first period
the loan officer will have a fraction pon of borrowers who are known to be type H and have been
related frauds, 55% of which resulted in major sanctions. F is naturally thought of as the expected punishment
resulting from being investigated (there is clearly a cost of being investigated even if you are innocent).
16
successful, a fraction (1 - po){l - pi) °f known L types who have all failed, and the rest, who
have also been successful, of an unknown type (type U). The first decision he has to take is what
to do about the firms that have failed. He can either report a default and take his punishment
of F or bail out the firm by giving it a fresh loan. 12 How big does the bailout loan need to be?
The loan officer will only bailout if, when the firm succeeds in the 2nd period, it can pay back
the new loan. If the bailout loan is I, the firm only gets to invest I — 1, because it has to give 1
unit back to the bank so that it does not default right away. Therefore for a successful bailout
we require that /(/ - 1) > /. The minimum loan size that will allow a successful bailout is l*
such that f(l* — 1) = /*. Obviously /* > 1. Since these firms are of type L, they are more likely
to default in the second period than either of the other types of firms. Hence, as long as the
other types of firms are willing to borrow more (which is what we will assume below), there is
never any reason to lend more than /* to a firm that is being bailed out. The choice is therefore
between giving the firm I*, which generates a possibility of a larger default in the future and
giving it nothing, which leads to a smaller but certain default now. Bailing out dominates if
F>(l-pL)l*F
which clearly holds, if (and only if)
l-PL<p (1)
Assume that this condition holds so that the loan officer always bails out those who fail in
the first period. There is no scope for bailing out in the second period because there is no future
in the relationship.
Given this the loan officer will have I + g - (I - po)(l - PlY* units of capital left to allocate
among the rest of the firms. Assume that he divides this equally among the known type H
firms. This gives them each —9 ~'
~ p°> {
-
~PL >
units. Assume that° POT
f{
i+9-(i-Po)a- PL)i*
> L (2)
PQTT
In other words, if the remaining capital is divided equally among the known H type firms, they
will be happy to take it. Since this also minimizes risk of default, this is what the loan officer
12This process of "evergreening" of loans by loan officers who prefer not to have a default in their hands, has
been widely noted in the Indian context (see, for example, Topalova (2004)), as well as elsewhere in the world.
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should do. 13
Notice as long as this condition 2 continues to hold, this result does not depend on the size
of g. Hence if as a result of a policy shift, the amount of subsidized credit available for lending
is larger, the essential pattern of lending does not change: the loans go to the type L and to
known type H firms, but now the type H firms get a bigger increment in their loan. This would
also be true if g went down as long as it is still the case that I + g - (1 — po)(l — pi)l* > 0.
Result 3: Under assumptions 1 and 2 the loan officer's optimal allocation of second period
credit is to give known type H firms an amount +9 ~^ ~^ ^
~PL
'
,
type L firms an amount
I* and the rest (i.e. type U firms) nothing. Variation in the size of g, within limits, does not
change the set of firms that get loans in the second period.
The logic of this result is straightforward. The loan officer wants to avoid default. Hence he
will bailout the existing firms that are in trouble but otherwise would like to focus entirely on
the firms that are proven to be safe. Given that subsidized credit is scarce, these firms will also
be happy to take what he is offering them.
The prediction that the firms of type U actually get a cut in their loan seems counterfactual
at least in the world of Indian firms. In our data many firms show no loan growth, but few see an
actual decline. This may be because if the firm anticipates a large cut in its loan, it will prefer
to default, and as a result loan officers want to commit to not cut loans between the first and
second period as long as the first period loan was repaid. If we make the auxiliary assumption
that loan size never goes down as long as the first period loan is repaid, and assume that g is
always large enough to allow this to happen, Result 3 would be restated as:
Result 4: Under the assumption that loan size never goes down as long as the first period
loan is repaid, as well as assumptions 1 and 2, the loan officer's optimal allocation of second
period credit is to give type H firms an loan increment of fl ~' ~
p
"^
~
» the type L firms
an increment oil* — 1 and the rest (i.e. type U firms) no increment. Variation in the size of g,
within limits, does not change the set of firms that get increments in the second period.
13We are cheating a bit here. The loan officer is actually indifferent between dividing the capital equally among
the H types and a range of other allocations where some H types get more than others. However the equal
division outcome is socially efficient (because / is strictly concave) and also the one that would obtain if the firms
lobby the loan officer for each extra dollar and those who have more to gain lobby more (once again, because /
is concave).
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3.2.3 Implications of results
Under the conditions 1 and 2, this very simple model therefore has several interesting implica-
tions.
1. The relation between loan growth and ex ante measures of firm performance (such as
first period revenue, first period profits) in the cross-section of firms, can be positive or
negative, or zero. The firms that have the highest loan growth from the first period to the
second may be either the best performing H type firms or worst performing L type firms
(depends on how I* compares with +g
~
(
~£ ^
~
) The intermediate U type firms get
no increments.
Note that this is quite consistent with the descriptive evidence reported in section 2, where
we showed no systematic relationship between measures of firm performance and probability of
a loan increment or amount of the increment.
2. A substantial part of loan growth under normal circumstances goes to firms that get bailed
out because they have failed (and are thus known to be bad). These firms are more likely
to fail again than the average firm. Therefore, the OLS estimate of loan growth on profit
growth will be biased downwards, since it confounds this (negative) selection effect and the
causal effect of loans. In contrast, the immediate impact of an unexpected policy change
that increases g is an increase in credit flows to firms that are expected to do well (type H
firms in our model). Therefore, an instrumental variable estimate of the impact of loans
on profit using the policy change as an instrument for change in lending will give us the
causal impact of extra lending on successful firms. This is because the IV estimate gives
us the ''local average treatment effect" (LATE), i.e. the effect of additional unit on credit
on the type of firms for which credit actually changes
The IV will therefore typically be larger than the OLS for two reasons: While it does
represent a causal effect, it is a causal effect within a selected group (in other words, the
"compilers" in this experiment will tend to have higher treatment effect than a random
firm chosen from the population).
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3. The set of firms that have credit growth is unchanged by the policy change-only the
magnitude of the credit inflow changes. This is because every firm wants more subsidized
credit and the loan officer always wants to give it to the safest firms (and to give more to
them if more if available) and therefore has no reason to try to spread it around. All the
effect of the reform should therefore be on the intensive margin.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Reduced Form Estimates
The empirical work follows directly from the previous section and seeks to establish the facts
that will allow us to determine whether firms are credit rationed and/or credit constrained.
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the extension of the priority sector definition in
1998 and its subsequent contraction in 2000. The reform did not seem to have large effects on
the composition of clients of the banks: in the sample, 25% of the small firms, and 28% of the
big firms have entered their relationship with the bank in 1998 or 1999. This suggests that the
banks was no more likely to take on big firms after the reform and that our results will not be
affected by sample selection.
Since the granted limit as well as all the outcomes we will consider, are very strongly auto-
correlated, we focus on the proportional change in this limit, i.e., log(limit granted in year t) —
log(limit granted in year t-1). 14 As motivation, table 4 shows the average change in the credit
limit faced by the firm in the three periods of interest (loans granted before the change in
January 1998, between January 1998 and January 2000, after January 2000) separately for the
largest firms (investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million), the
medium-sized firms (investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 and Rs. 10 million),
and the smaller firms (investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million).
For limits granted in 1997 the average increment in the limit over the previous years's limit
was 7% larger for the small firms compared to medium firms and 2% larger for small firms
compared to the biggest firms. For limit granted in 1998 and 1999, it was 2% larger for medium
1 Since the source of variation in this paper is closely related to the size of the firm, we express all the variables
in log to avoid spurious scale effects.
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firms, and 7% larger for the biggest firms, compared, once again to the smallest firms. After
2000, limit increases were smaller for all firms, but the biggest declined happened for the larger
firms, whose enhancement declined from an average of 14% in 1998 and 1999 to 0% in 2000. 15
Panel B in table 4 shows that the average increase in the limit was not due to an increase
in the probability that the working capital limit got changed: big firms were no more likely to
experience a change in 1998 or 1999 than in 1997. This is consistent with implication 3 from
the model in the previous section, which tells us that when loan officers need to respond to
pressure from the bank to expand lending to the newly eligible big firms, they prefer giving
larger increases to those which would have received an increase in any case and are known to
be safe, rather than increasing the number of firms whose limit's are increased.
In Panel C, we show the average increase in the limit, conditional on the limit having changed.
The average percentage enhancement was larger for the small firms than the medium and large
firms in 1997, smaller for the small firms than for the large firms in 1998 and 1999 (and about
the same for the medium firms), and larger after 2000. The average enhancement conditional on
a change in limit declined dramatically for the largest firm after 2000 (it went from an average
of 0.44 to an average of slightly less than 0).
Our strategy will be to use these two changes in policy as a source of shock to the availability
of bank credit to the medium and larger firms, using firms outside this category to control for
possible trends.
We start by running the regression equivalent of the simple difference-in-differences above.
First use the data from 1997 to 2000 and estimate and equation of the form: 16
log kblt - log fcwt-i = a lkbBIGl + lkbPOST + llkbBIG, * POSTt + elkm , (3)
where we adopt the following convention for the notation: kba is a measure of the bank credit
limit to firm i in year t (and therefore granted (i.e., decided upon) some time during the year
t — l
17
), BIG is a dummy indicating whether the firm has investment in plant and machinery
between Rs. 6.5 millions and Rs. 30 millions, and POST is a dummy equal to one in the years
Note that there is no reason to expect a decline in the loan limit for the larger firms in 2000, we just expect
a bigger drop in the increase in limit between 1998-1999 and 2000.
16
All the standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
1770% of the credit reviews happen during the last 6 months of the year, including 15% in December alone.
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1999 and 2000 (The reform was passed in 1998. It therefore affected the credit decisions for
the revision conducted during the year 1998 and 1999, affecting the credit available in 1999 and
2000). We focus on working capital loans from this bank. 18 We estimate this equation in the
entire sample and in the sample of accounts for which there was no revision in the amount of
the loan. We expect a positive y\ kb .
We will also run a regression of the same form using a dummy for whether the firms got any
increment as the dependent variable. The model predicts in this case that the coefficient of the
variable BIG*' POST should be zero. Finally, equation (3) will be estimated in the sample with
an increment greater than zero.
To study the impact of the contraction of the priority sector on bank loans, we use the
1999-2002 data and estimate the following equation:
log kbit - log kbit-i = a2kbBIG2 t + (32kbPOST2 + l2kbBIG2, * POST2 t + e2kbiU (4)
where BIG2 is a dummy indicating whether the firm has investment in plant and machinery
between Rs. 10 millions and Rs. 30 millions, and POST2 is a dummy equal to one in the years
2001 and 2002. 19 . Once again, this equation will be estimated in the whole sample and for the
firms that got p, positive increment we will also estimate a similar equation for an indicator for
whether the firms had any change in the limit.
Finally, we pool the data and estimate the equation:
log km - log kbu-1 = cyzkbBIG2 l + a4kbMEDi + p3kbPOST + f34kbPOST2 +
j3kbBIG2 t * POSTt + likbMEDl * POSTt +
%kbBI.G2i * POST2 t + jekbMEDi * POST2t + e3kbiu (5)
18Using total working capital loans from the banking sector instead leads to almost identical results, since most
firms borrow only from this bank.
19Once again, we adopt the convention that we look at credit available in year t, and therefore granted in year
t—\. The reform was passed in 2000 and therefore affected credit decisions taken during the year 2000 and credit
available in the year 2001.
22
where MED is a dummy indicating that the firm's investment in plant and machinery is between
Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 10 million.
After having demonstrated that the reform did cause relatively larger increases in bank loans
for the affected firm, we run a number of other regressions that exactly parallel equations (3) to
(5). First, we use the sample 1997-2000 to estimate:
yit - ytt-i = a lyBIGl + PiyPOSTt + ^ yBIG r * POSTt + e lyU , (6)
where yu is an outcome variable (such as credit, sales, or cost) for firm i in year t. Second, we
estimate:
logy,, - log.i/it-i = a2yBIG2i + j32yPOST2 + y2yBIG2i * POST2 t + e 2yit , (7)
in the sample 1999-2002
,
and finally we estimate:
log yit - log ylt- x = a3yBlG2i + a4yMEDz + 3yPOST + p4yPOST2 +
l3yBIG2 t * POSTt + l4yMEDi * POSTt +
+75yJB/G2 t * POST2 t + jeyMEDi * POST2 t + e3yit (8)
in the 1997-2003 sample.
Our model predicts that only impact of the reform is on the intensive margin: firms pro-
identified as good will now get a larger increase in their loan. Some firms which had previously
failed will also get an increase in loan to be bailed out, but that probability will not be affected
by the reform. The firms which did not fail but on which the credit officer has no information
will not receive an increment. Under the assumption in the model, it is thus appropriate to
estimate equation y\ to j/3 separately in two sub-samples: the sample with an increment in
limit, and the sample without increment. Sample selection will not bias the results, because
it is uncorrelated with the regressors of interest (the variable BIG * POST) (Heckman (1979),
Heckman and Robb (1986), Angrist (1995)).
The prediction that selection of firms getting positive increment is uncorrelated to the reform
is consistent with what we observe in table 3 and 4. In particular, there isn't any evidence that
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the probability of a change in the limit is affected by the policy change. It could of course still
be the case that the number of firms that get a change in the limit is unaffected by the reform,
but the type of the firms that get chosen is affected by the reform. This could then bias the
results in the selected sample. However, this is not what the model predicts. Both before and
after the reforms, failing firms and firms that have been identified as efficient should be selected.
Empirically, when we regress pre-determined characteristics of firms with positive increment on
the variables POST, BIG and BIG * POST before and after the reforms, we see no impact
(results omitted).
If the assumptions in the model are right, we should then expect the coefficients of BIG *
POST and BIG2 * POST2 to be zero in all the equations in the sample without change in
limit, which provides a test of the identification assumptions. Restricting the sample to firms
with a positive increment in limit will also increase the precision of the estimates of the reform
on sales, costs and profits for firms which were actually affected by the reform.
Below, we describe the variables we use and their justification.
• Credit rationing
Following result 1 , we provide two additional pieces of evidence to establish credit rationing:
First, we show that the firm used the extra funds they got, using a standard measure of utilization
for a credit limit: the logarithm of the ratio of total borrowing under the line of credit during
the year (in banker's parlance, the turnover on the account) to the credit limit. Second, we
check that the interest rate did not change (which is what would be expected)
• Credit constraints
If a firm were credit constrained, our theory tells us that sales revenue would definitely go
up, while if it were not, sales should only go up for firms that have already fully substituted
bank credit for their market borrowing. Given that we are looking at increases in the availability
of working capital, we expect the increase in sales to take place the year the capital becomes
available (the data shows that the working capital limits is turned over several times during the
year), i.e. the year after the limits was decided upon. To interpret the effect of credit expansion
on sales, we posit a simple parametric relation between credit and sales revenue in the case of
success: Rn = Aukft . Note that this is a specific parametrization of the production function
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introduced in the previous sub-section. 20 Taking logs:
log Rit = log Ait + log kit . (9)
DifFerencing this equation gives:
log Ri t - log J^t- 1 = log Ait - log At- 1 +0[logku - logfcit^i], (10)
for firms that succeeded in both periods. Assume that when firms fail, they get a small amount
of sales such that log Rn = vn (failing likely does not involve zero sales, but rather zero profit). 21
Focusing on the first experiment (credit expansion), the growth of bank credit for the firms
that were successful in period 1, and for which the bank received a signal is given an equation
of the form of equation (3).
In the absence of complete substitution between bank credit and market credit, this implies
a relationship of the same shape for capital stock:
log ku ~ log ha-! = aiSkBIGi + l3lSkPOSTt + -nSkRIGi * POSTt + e lku , (11)
which when substituted in equation (10) yields
log Ru - log flit-i = log Au - log At-i + O^skBIG, + 31SkPOSTt + j!SkBIGi * POSTt + e lklt ).
(12)
If we restrict the sample to firms with a positive increment in limits, there are two kinds of
such firms in period t: the firms that failed in period t-1 (which needs to be bailed out), and
the firms that succeeded in period t-1 and about which the bank received a positive signal.
The 'latter firms are successful in both period, so their sales is governed by equation 12. In
the case of the failed firms the loan increment they get is fixed (it is the minimum they need
to be bailed out)-. In period t-1, they get the failure outcome (log(Rlt -i) = itjt-i-)- In period
20This is best thought of as a reduced form, derived from a more primitive technology which makes output a
Cobb-Douglas function of the amount of n inputs x\,X2...xn . As long as the inputs have to purchased using the
working capital and all inputs are purchased in competitive markets, it can be shown that the resulting indirect
production function has the form given above.
21
It would simplify the exposition to say that the failing outcome is simply a low An so the sales remain
proportional to the amount lent. But we show below that this is not a necessary assumption in this set up, so we
avoid making it.
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t, they get the success outcome with probability p (and this equal to Ait ki t , where ku is the
minimum capital a failed firm needs to be bailed out, and the failure outcome with probability
1 — p). Thus, for firms that failed in period t-1, neither the increase in loans nor the increase
in revenues is correlated with the reform, though they might get more money in period t than
in period t-1, and big firms may be getting more money because they need more to survive. In
other words, for these firms, the increase in loans and revenues in both periods take respectively
the form:
log ku - logh^ = ai FkBIGi + lFkPOSTt + u> lklt , (13)
and:
log B* - log Ikt-\ = a1FRBIG z + (3lFRPOSTt + mkit, (14)
Combining failed firms and successful firms in the loan equation (which is what we do when
we estimate equation 3 in the sample of firms with positive increment) thus implies that
"jikb —
7isfc6<f>, where 4> is the share of successful firms in the sample of firms with positive increment,
and estimating equation (6) above in the sample sample (with sales as the dependent variable,
and denoting 71.R the coefficient of BIG * POST in this equation) implies that 71/2 = 6f\sk4>-
Thus, the coefficient in both equations are the causal impact of the reform for the successful
firms, multiplied by the fraction of successful firms. In section 5.4 below, we discuss that the
ratio of the two can be interpreted as an IV estimate of the impact of bank loan on revenues.
Our identification hypothesis is that for successful firms
\ogAit - log Ait-x = aiABIGi + 0iAPOSTt + tit t (15)
and that a similar conditions is true for failed firms (neither the failed payoff nor the successfull
payoff is correlated with the interaction BIG * POST).
This amounts to assuming that the rate of change of A (which is a shift parameter in
the production function) did not change differentially for big and small firms in the year of
the priority sector expansion. Under this assumption 7/? gives the reduced form effect of the
expansion of the priority sector on sales revenue.
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If we consider the entire sample instead if looking only at the firms that have received a
positive increment, the reasoning would be exactly the same, except that in that case, the
coefficients of BIG * POST in the sales equation and in the loan equations are both multiplied
by the share of successful firms on which the loan officer has received a signal in the entire
sample.
Similar calculations lead to an equation of the same form, similar to equation (8) for the
priority sector contraction (2000-2002), where the identification hypothesis is that
log Ait ~ log Au-i = a2ABIG2 l + (32APOST2 t . (16)
If firms are credit constrained, 7i/{ should be positive and •yok should be negative, while if no
firms are credit constrained 71^ will only be positive for those firms that have fully substituted
market credit, and 72;? will be negative only for those firms that had no market credit initially.
We therefore also estimate a version of equation (6) in the sample of firms whose total current
liabilities exceed their bank credit. If the firms were not credit constrained, the value of 77? and
72/? in this sample should be zero.
A final piece of evidence comes from looking at profit. Profits are expected to increase
regardless of whether the firm is credit constrained or not (since the interest payments go
down), but the extent of the increase in profit is nevertheless interesting, since it can give us
some indication of the firm's marginal return to capital.*'"
4.2 Empirical Strategy: Testing the Identification assumptions
The interpretation of the central result on sales growth crucially depends on the assumptions
made in equation (15) and (16). Likewise, the interpretation of the other results depends -on
the assumption that the error term is not correlated with the regressors, most importantly
BIG * POST in equation (6) and BIG2 * POST2 in equation (7). However, there are many
reasons why this assumption may not hold. For example, big and small firms may be differently
affected by other measures of economic policy (they could belong to different sectors, and these
sectors may be affected by different policies during this period).
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In the. working paper version of (.he paper, we derive and diseuss interpretation of t.he results on profits under
various assumptions.
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The fact that we have two experiments affecting different sets of firms help distinguishing the
effect of the priority sector regulation from trends affecting different groups of firms differentially.
The two reforms went in different directions and did not affect all the firms identically. Credit
constraints would predict 71 /? in equation (6) to be positive and 72/? in equation (7) to be
negative. Moreover, the ratio •^La- and -^- should be equal.
The same reasoning of course applies to equations (5) and (8) (which combine the two
experiments), as well, so that the ratios ~^-, ~3L
,
^- should also all be equal. This is a natural
over-identification test: if all these equalities are satisfied, it would be extremely implausible that
the observed patterns come from the fact that the time trends are different for small and large
firms.
Even if all these tests work, we would still need to worry about the possibility that, being
labeled as a priority sector firm affects the sales and profitability of a firm over and above its
effects on credit access. First, SSI firms are exempt from some types of excise taxation. Second,
the right to manufacture certain products is reserved for the SSI sector. We will address the first
concern by using profit before tax in all specifications. The second concern could be a problem:
among the small firms, 44% manufacture a product that is reserved for SSI. Among the big
firms, 24% do. One control strategy would be to leave out all firms that manufacture products
that are reserved for SSI. Unfortunately, we only know what products the firm manufactured
in 1998. Excluding firms that manufactured SSI reserved products in 1998 does not change the
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results. However it remains possible that some of the big firms moved into reserved product
after 1998 and this increased their sales and profits.
A way to resolve this issue is to focus on a different test of the identification assumption,
which is to estimate equations (6) to (8) for all the different outcomes variables separately in
two subsamples: one subsample made of the firm-year observations where there was no change
in the granted limit from the previous year to the current year, and one subsample made of
firms where there was a change. If there is an effect of just becoming entitled to produce the
products on the SSI list even the big firms that had no change in the granted limit should show a
change after the reform. We therefore test whether the coefficient of BIG*POST is statistically
indistinguishable from zero in the sample of firms that did not get a change. As we discussed
above this is consistent under the assumptions of the mode.
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5 Results
5.1 Credit
• Credit Expansion
Panel A in table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (3) for several credit vari-
ables. 23 We start with a variable indicating whether there was any change in the granted limit
(columns (1)), and two dummies indicating whether there was an increase or a decrease in the
granted limit. Consistent with the model and the evidence we discussed above, there seem to be
absolutely no correlation between the probability of getting a change in limit and the interaction
BIG * POST. Moreover, even the main effects of BIG and POST'&xe very small: none of the
variables in this regression seem to affect whether the file was granted a change in limit or not.
There is also no effect of the interaction on the probability of getting an increase or a decrease
in the limit.
In the columns (4), to (7) we look at limit granted by the bank. 24 As the descriptive
evidence in table 4 suggested, relative to small firms, loans from this bank to big firms increased
significantly faster after 1998 than before: the coefficient of the interaction POST*BIG is 0.095,
in the complete sample, and 0.27 in the sample for which there is any change in limit. Both
of these coefficient are statistically significant, and indicate a large change in the availability of
credit for the sample of firms that were reviewed. There was a decline in the average enhancement
for small firms (the dummy for POST is negative). Before the expansion of the priority sector,
medium and large firms were granted smaller proportional enhancement than small firms (the
coefficient of the variable BIG is -0.22, with a standard error of 0.088). The gap completely
closed after the reform (the coefficient of the interaction is actually larger in absolute value than
the coefficient of the variable BIG, although the difference is small).
In columns (6) and (7) , we restrict the sample to observations where we have data on future
sales (which will be the first stage for the IV estimation of the impact of bank loans on sales).
The coefficient is almost the same (0.26) and still significant.
23The standard errors in all regressions are adjusted for heteroskedaticity and clustering at the firm and sector
levels.
If, instead, we use the sum of the limits from the entire banking sector, we obtain virtually identical estimates:
this simply reflects the fact that most firms borrow only from one bank.
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• Credit contraction
In panel B, we present the result of estimating equation (4). Here again, we find no effect of
the contraction on the probability that the limit is changed (column (1)), which reinforces the
claim that the decision to change the limit has nothing to do with the priority sector regulation.
However, the probability that the limit is cut goes up significantly for the largest firms after the
reversal of the reform in 2000 (the coefficient is 0.119, with a standard error of 0.033). Turning
to the magnitude of the change in limit, the coefficient of the interaction BIG2 * POST is
negative both in the entire sample (in column (4), the coefficient is -0.12) and the sample with
a change in limit (column (5), the coefficient is -0.44). The average yearly decline in the limit
for big firms after 2000 is larger, than the average yearly increase in limit in 1998 and 1999. The
results are very similar in the sample where we have data on sales (columns (6) and (7)). 25
In panel C, we present the interaction coefficients 73^;, to ^§kb (the corresponding main
effects are not presented in the tables, but were included in the regression). The coefficient
of MED * POST2 is positive and significant in column (1): Relative to other firms, medium
firms became less likely to experience a change in limit after 2000. It may be because they have
experienced relatively large changes in the two years before.
The effect on the magnitude in the change in the limit granted by the banks are presented
in column (4) (whole sample) and (5) (the sample where the limit was changed). During the
expansion of the priority sector, the limits of both medium and large firms increased significantly
more than that of small firms. The impact of the reform was similar for medium and large
firms, both of which became eligible. During the contraction, large firms, who lost eligibility,
experienced a significant reduction in their credit limit relative to small firms. Medium firms
(who did not lose eligibility) also suffered a decline but the coefficient is much smaller than that
for large firms. (In column (5) for example, the coefficient of MED * POST2 is -0.18, while
that of BIG * POST is -0.48. Only the later is significant). 26
25The sample size drops in this column since we are not using the data from the last year when we have data
on loans but not on sales.
26The effect on medium firms may come from the fact that we, classified firms as medium firms based on the
earliest data we have on them (1997). Some of them have almost certainly grown since and are now being treated
by the bank as large firms, even though we are treating them as medium firms.
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5.2 Evidence of Credit Rationing
Table 6 presents evidence on credit rationing. As before, panel A focuses on the expansion
experiment, and panel B focuses on the contraction experiment.
Columns (1) to (3) present the results for the interest rate. The first column shows levels, the
second column logarithms, and the third column replaces the difference rt — r t -\ by a dummy
indicating whether the interest rate fell in between the two years. There seems to be strong
evidence that the interest rate did not decline for big firms (relative to small firms) as they
entered the priority sector. In all three samples and for ,all three measures we consider, the
interaction BIG * POST is insignificant in panel A, and the point estimate would suggest a
relative increase of the interest rate, rather than a decrease. In the complete sample, in levels, the
point estimate is 0.073, with a standard error of 0.17. 27 In logs the coefficient of the interaction
is 0.002, with a standard error of 0.011. In panel B, the coefficient of BIG2 * POST2 is likewise
insignificant in all the specifications.
This shows that the fact that big firms are borrowing more from the banks after the ex-
pansions and less after the contraction, is not explained by a fall in the interest rate on bank
lending. To complete the argument we also need to show that firms actually use the additional
credit they get when there is an expansion. 28 To look at this, we compute limit utilization.
When wo use this variable as the dependent variable, the coefficient of BIG * POST is negative
and insignificant both during the expansion and during the contraction.
This results are far from definitive, due to the limited number of observations for which the
data on turnover is available. 29 However, the evidence available suggests that firms did make
use of the extension in credit without a change in interest rate. This suggests that firms are
willing to absorb the additional credit at the rate at which it is offered by the bank. We now
turn to sales and profit data to assess whether firm's activity is constrained by their limited
access to credit.
27The average change in interest rate in sample period was 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.86.
28This is not automatic, since under the Indian system the bank gives the firms an extension of their credit
line, but firms only pay for the amount they actually draw.
29For example, we do not present the results for loan utilization for firms whose limit changed, because we have
very to few observations on turnover in each cell in this restricted sample.
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5.3 Evidence of Credit Constraints
Table 7 present evidence on credit constraints.
• Credit Expansion
In panel A, column (1), we start by looking at the impact of the credit expansion on sales.
In order to keep the table manageable, we present only the coefficient of the interactions, which
are the coefficients of interest (the coefficients of the main effects are available upon request).
Of note among unreported coefficients is the coefficient of the 'TOST" variable, which is small
in absolute value and insignificant in all specifications and for all dependent variables.
The coefficient of the interaction BIG * POST is 0.194 in the sample with a change in limit,
with a standard error of 0.106. In the sample where there is no change in limits, sales did not
increase disproportionately for large firms: the coefficient of the interaction is 0.007, with a
standard error of 0.074. This supports our identification assumption that the difference in the
annual rate of growth of An was not differentially affected in the year 1999.
The increase in sales suggests that firms were not only credit rationed, but also credit con-
strained, unless we are in the case where bank credit completely substituted for market credit.
We do not have reliable data on market credit, but we have a proxy for trade credit, the differ-
ence between total current liabilities and the bank limit. In column (2) we restrict the sample
to firms that, according to this measure, have not stopped using trade credit (i.e., this measure
has not become or smaller). The coefficient of BIG * POST is similar as what it is in the
full sample (0.168): the increase in sales is not due to firms that had first completely substi-
tuted away from trade credit. Moreover, note that very few firms drop from the sample where
we focus on firms that have positive non-bank liability (i.e, we drop firms without any market
borrowing), which in itself suggests that substitution cannot be easy. The results in column (1)
and (2) together with the previous results establishing credit rationing, suggest that firms are
credit constrained: sales increased for firms that still had non-bank credit, and very few firms
substituted entirely. Below, we use the magnitude of the estimates to argue that there seems to
have been little substitution of bank credit for market credit.
Although finding an effect on profit would not be sufficient to establish the presence of credit
constraints (since part of the effect on profit comes directly from the subsidy), establishing the
magnitude of the effect on profit is a useful complement to the results on sales. Using the
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logarithm of profit as the dependent variable presents the difficulty that this variable is not
defined whenever profit is negative. We can thus only estimate the effect on profit for firms that
have a positive profit in both periods, which introduces sample selection and makes the profit
regressions difficult to interpret.
To avoid this problem, we look at the direct impact of the reform on the logarithm of cost
(defined as sales-profits), which is always defined. The effect on profit for any particular firm or
for the average firm can then be recovered from the estimate of the reform on sales and costs,
without sample selection bias. The increase in sales is accompanied by an increase in cost of
comparable magnitude: the coefficient on the BIG * POST interaction is 0.187 in the sample
with change in limit, and only 0.005 in the sample without change in limit.
For comparison, we also present the results on directly estimating the profit, equation in
column (4). The effect on profit is very large. The coefficient of the interaction BIG * POST
in the sample with change in limit is 0.54, with a standard error of 0.28.
• Credit Contraction
Panel B presents the estimate of the effect of the credit contraction on the sales and costs
of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million (using all the other
firms as a control) and Rs. 30 million. In the sample where there was a change in limit, the
coefficient of the interaction BIG2*POST2 is negative and large (-0.403, with a standard error
of 0.207). Here again, there is little evidence of substitution. The result is similar if we restrict
the analysis to the sample of firms that have some market borrowing. The coefficient of the
interaction BIG2 * POST2 in the cost equation is negative and similar to the effect on sales
(-0.374).
In the sample where there was no change in limit, in contrast there is no significant effect
either on sales or on costs.
• Pull sample and overidentification tests
Table 8 present the results of estimating equation (8) for sales and costs. We use the
entire period, and we estimate separately the coefficients of the interactions BIG * POST,
MED * POST, BIG2 * POST2 and MED * POST2 (where MED is a dummy indicating that
the firm's investment in plant and machinery is between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 10 million).
We also present in the table the ratios of the interaction coefficient in the outcome equation
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and to the corresponding coefficient in the loan equation (from table 5, panel B, column (7)).
In the sales and cost equations, the coefficients have the expected pattern: both the coefficients
of the MED * POST and BIG2 * POST interactions are positive (though when introduced
separately, they lose significance). The coefficient of the interaction BIG2 * POST2 is negative
and significant and, while negative, the coefficient of the interaction MED * POST2 is only
20% of the BIG2 * POST2 coefficient and insignificant. The coefficients are similar in the full
sample and the sample "without substitution.
Formally, the overidentification test does not reject the hypothesis that the implied effect of
credit on the sales and cost variables is the same for all the sources of variation. For example,
if we look at the sales equation in column (1), the ratio between the coefficients in the sales
equation and the corresponding coefficients in the loan equation are similar (they range between
0.73 and 0.83), and the test does not reject the hypothesis that they are equal. This result
makes it very implausible that the estimated coefficient reflect differential trends arising from
other, unobserved, factors.
Taken together, these results present a consistent picture which suggests that firms face
credit constraints. The sales of the firms affected by the reform increased when the reform
resulted in an expansion in credit, and decreased when the reform led to a contraction. A subset
of firms that was affected by the expansion, but not the contraction, behaved like the affected
firms in the expansion, but like an unaffected firms in the contraction. These results taken
together suggest that it is unlikely that the effects are driven by time trends affecting different
firms differentially. Furthermore, these results are concentrated in the firms that experienced a
change in loans, which makes it unlikely that the effect is driven by differential trends.
A last piece of important evidence is whether a credit expansion is associated with an increase
in the probability of default : the increase in profits (and sales) may otherwise reflect more risky
strategies pursued by the large firms. In order to answer this question, we use data on Non
Performing Assets (NPAs). Since it takes at least a year for a loan that has gone bad to be
officially qualified as an NPA, we treat the years 1998 and 1999 as the "pre" period, the year
2000 and 2001 as the period following the expansion, and 2002 as the period following the
contraction. In 1998 and 1999, 1% of the loans to medium and large firms, and 4% of the loans
to small firms, became NPA. 5.5% of the medium and large firms, and 5% of the small firms
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that were not NPAs in 1999 became NPAs in 2000 or 2001. While the growth in NPA is faster
for the loans to big firms, the difference is very small. Conversely, 3% of the loans to the largest
firms (with investment in plant and machinery above 10 million) and 2% of those to small and
medium firms that were not NPAs by 2001 became NPAs in 2002. Additional credit does not
seem to have led an unusually large number of firms to default.
5.4 Instrumental Variables Estimates: the impact of bank credit on sales and
profit
The discussion in section 4 suggests that equation (3) to (5) and (6) to (8) respectively form the
first stage and the reduced form of an instrumental strategy of estimating the impact of bank
loan on sales (or any other outcome variable y): in the sample of firms with an increment, the
coefficient of the interaction BIG * POST in equation (3) is the causal impact of the priority
sector expansion on the volume of loans to good firms, multiplied by the fraction of good firms
in this sample. The coefficient of the interaction BIG * POST is the causal effect of the reform
on sales, multiplied by the fraction of good firms in the sample. Assuming that the only impact
of the reform on sales is due to its impact of credit (which we will verify later), this indicates
that, controlling for BIG and POST, BIG * POST is thus a valid instrument for the impact of
bank loans on the sales of the firms that are known to be good (the ratio of the coefficients in
the reduced from and and first stage equation is equal to the impact of credit on sales for good
firms).
In this last sub-section, we present (in table 9) instrumental variable estimates of the effect
of bank loans on sales, costs and profit. For comparison, we also present the weighted least
squares estimate, Column (1) presents the IV estimate of the effect of bank loans on sales, using
the instrument BIG* POST in the sample with a change in loan in the 1997-2000 period. The
coefficient is 0.75, with a standard error of 0.37. Column (2) uses the "contraction" experiment
(the instrument BIG2 * POST2 in the 1999-2002 period). This estimate (0.73) is very close to
the previous one, which is just, a way to restate the result of the overidentification test that we
already saw. Finally, column (3) uses the entire period and three instruments (MED * POST,
BIG * POST and BIG2 * POST2). The coefficient is, once again, very close to what it was in
columns (1) and (2) (0.76).
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If firms do not increase market credit in proportion to the increase in bank credit, these
estimates of 9 (the elasticity of sales with respect to bank credit) provide a lower bound on 9
(the elasticity of sales with respect to overall credit) for these firms: To see why, rewrite equation
(10), to obtain:
log Rit = log An + log kbu - 01og Jg. (17)
Differencing over time:
log flit - logfl^! = logA it - log Ait-i + e[\ogkbit - log.fcWt-i] - <?[log|| - log^ffr]- (18)
We do not observe log^ - log ^ffy and therefore estimate an equation of the form:
log fli t - log A^-j = 6[log kbit ~ log kbit--]] + vit (19)
The term 0[\og
-Mf - log .
b?
~l ] , which is omitted when estimating equation (19), should typically
be positively affected by the reform. The one exception is the case where the firm is credit
constrained and access to market capital increases so fast as a function of access to bank capital
that total capital stock goes up faster than bank capital-which seems rather implausible. This
suggests that 6 will be a lower bound for 9.
The elasticity of sales with respect to bank loans, 8, gives some additional information about
the plausibility of the firms having substituted the bank loans for the market credit. To see this,
note that
_
Afl_fc
=
Afl kb + km _ - 1 krn
A7c A Akb + A/cm A 1 + Akm/Akb kb
If there is substitution of bank credit for market credit, A/cm is negative while Akb is positive
In this (possibly hypothetical) scenario
9>e[l + ^}. (20)h
9 is equal to about 0.75. Using the Prowess data set, Topalova (2004) estimates that the ratio of
short run bank debt over total liability in Indian manufacturing is about 0.5 from 1996 onwards,
implying a ratio of ip of about 1. Therefore in this scenario our estimate would suggest an 8
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of above 1.5 in the neighborhood of the current capital stock, implying that the firm must be
credit constrained (a 8 > 1 suggests local increasing returns and,hence the firm must want to
borrow more) and therefore unwilling to cut back on any form of credit.
Column (4) restricts the sample to firms that do not produce SSI products, since, as we
mention before, one advantage of SSI status is that it gives an exclusive right to produce some
goods. The coefficient is somewhat smaller and less precise, though it is not statistically different
from the result in the whole sample (the coefficient on sales is 0.50, with a standard error of
0.35). In column (5), we go back to all the firms, and we include firms with no change in limit.
The estimate is a little higher (0.93) but very imprecise. Finally the last column present the
OLS estimate, which is smaller than the IV estimate, consistent with our model predicts.
Panel B present the estimate of the effort of bank loans on costs. The estimates we obtain
here axe, again, very close to each other, and just a little smaller than the effect of the loans on
sales.
We can use these estimate to get a sense of the average increase in profit caused by every
rupee in loan. The average loan (averaging across years and firms) is Rs. 8,680,000 (about 45
days of sales) . Therefore, using the coefficients in column (3), an increase of Rs. 100,000 in the
loan corresponds to an increase in Rs. (610,000 in sales, and Rs. 537,000 increase in costs. This
implies an Rs. 73,000 increase in profit for the average firm, after repaying interest.
In panel C, we present, for the sake of comparison, the direct IV estimate of loans on
log(profit), despite the fact that these regression suffer from the sample selection induced by the
omission of the firms with negative profits. The estimates vary between 1.79 and 2.00. Taking
1.79 as the estimate of the effect of the log increase in loan on log increase in profit, an increase
of Rs. 100,000 in lending causes a 2% increase in profit. At the mean profit (which is Rs.
3,670,000), this would correspond to an increase in profit of Rs. 72,000 after repaying interest,
which is very similar to what we found using cost and sales as the dependent variables.
Can a net return of 72% or 73% be explained by the subsidy implicit in the program?
After correcting for default risk and administrative costs and using a cost of capital of 12%,
we estimate the cost of lending to the priority sector for Indian sector public banks to be 22%,
which is higher than the 16% the firms actually pay. But a subsidy of 6% makes very little dent
on a net return of 72%. Indeed the excess return would still be sizeable if we were to decide
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that the public sector banks are pricing their credit wrong and that they should charge 3% per
month (42% per year) which seems to be the going rate on trade credit for these relatively large
firms.
The private return on an extra rupee of loans to firms in this sample is close to 90% (72%
+ 16%). The social return is about 83% (the social cost of capital is 6% higher than the private
cost). Both these returns are correctly read as answers to the question: what happens if the
bank lends an extra rupee to the firms that have had a history of success. The private return
is therefore the right number to use for calculating the short-run impact of a shock to the
bank's balance sheet, while the social return is what the social planner should use in deciding
how credit should be allocated. The magnitude of these numbers tells us that known highly
profitable opportunities remain uno.xploite.d in the Indian economy.
However since this is the return to captial in case of success, both of these numbers probably
over-state the impact we would expect if the bank's lending was permanently raised since in
the long run not all "good" firms will remain that way (markets change, managers retire) and
the bank will have to lend to new firms of unknown quality in order to identify future winners.
Moreover these returns cannot be read as the average return on a dollar of bank lending. In our
model it is clear that the average bank loan is much more likely to go to a "bad" firm than the
marginal loan that results from the expansion of a directed lending program. Consistent with
this we find that in the data the OLS estimates of the effect of loan increases on sales or profit
increases are both smaller than the IV estimates. For sales, the OLS estimate is significantly
positive, but only 0.28. The OLS estimates of the effect of loans on profit is even smaller and
insignificant. Although due to large standard errors, we cannot reject the equality of the OLS
and the IV estimates, the difference clearly goes in the right direction that OLS is smaller than
IV. Our estimate therefore should be seen as the causal estimate of the marginal value of an
additional dollar lent, as long as there are enough credit constrained good firms in the bank's
portfolio.
It. is, however, not obvious that we should think of these returns as the return to any specific
factor (capital, in the form of machines, say). The most common use of this money is probably
to pay wages (because paying labor is the one thing one cannot use trade credit for), but it is
possible that getting access to this extra money will also impact the borrower's ability to get
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more trade credit and hence expand the firm's use of other inputs as well. The observed effect
of the extra rupee will then be some combination of the effect of extra labor and the effect of
the extra units of the other factors.
6 Conclusion: Policy Issues
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that many relatively large firms in India were
severely credit constrained during 1998-2002. It might be tempting to see this as a cautionary
tale about what happens when banks, as in India, are largely publicly owned.
As shown in section 2, it is true that the particular public sector bank we study is quite rigid
in the way it allocates credit, and one could imagine this leading to substantial deviations from
optimality in the allocation. Indeed this is what the model in section 3 predicts.
However this cannot be the whole story: During the period of our study, and especially
during the period covered by the later experiment (2000-2002), private banks were quite active
in the Indian banking sector—almost a quarter of the total credit to firms in the economy came
from private banks, including a number of multinational banks. If the entire underlending was
a product of the irrationality of the public bank, any of these private banks could have stepped
in - the firms in our sample are but a drop in the ocean compared to the total lending of any
one of the private or multinational banks operating in India. Our firms, all based in relatively
urban areas, certainly had the option of approaching a non-public sector bank for additional
credit and perhaps did. The interesting question is why nevertheless, they did not invest much
more, especially given the enormous profitability of additional investment.
One possible answer is that the local private banks were still in their infancy and did not
yet have enough resources to lend to these firms—this puts the blame on the pre-liberalization
policy of public ownership, albeit indirectly. It is, however, belied by the fact that these banks
were investing heavily in government bonds throughout this period. It also seems less plausible
in the case of the multinational banks. A more plausible version of this argument points to
the fact that lending to the small-scale sector requires specific expertise that is only acquired
over time and most non-public sector banks do not yet have it. This would suggest that the
existing public sector banks, once privatized, may be much more effective than the present crop
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of private banks, precisely because they have the requisite experience. 30
There are however good reasons not to be quite so optimistic. Stein (2001) has argued that
the inability to lend effectively to small borrowers is in the very nature of being a bank: banks
have a natural tendency to be large, in order to spread out idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand,
being larger necessarily increases the distance between the owners and the many loan officers
who deal with small borrowers. Since loan officers need to take decisions about relatively large
amounts of money that do not belong to them, and defaults are costly for the bank, 31 it is very
important that the loan officers have the right incentives. This obviously gets harder as the
distance between the owner and the loan officer grows. Banks deal with this problem in part
by restricting the domain of the loan officer's authority: in particular, by making rules, based
on easily measured characteristics of the borrower, about how much they can borrow and by
penalizing the loan officer for defaults. As in our model, this discourages the loan officer from
lending, unless the firm is a very sure bet. This obviously limits the discretion the loan officer
enjoys and makes his lending less effective, but it covers the bank. 3 " An obvious social cost is
that small firms have a hard time borrowing. 33
This is not to say that some characteristics of the India economy such as the cost of enforcing
a loan contract are not important in understanding why no one wants to lend to these firms.
30This also suggests that while the public sector banks are probably over-staffed, the extent of over-staffing may
be over-estimated if we directly compare private and public banks, because private and public sector currently
play very different roles. Banerjee et al. (2004) contains an overall assessment of the performance of the Indian
public sector.
31 Defaults are also quite common, at least in India. Working capital loans in India are not nearly as safe as
they are supposed to be (and actually are, at least in the US). This is because the borrower can easily sell off
the inventories that are supposed to be securing the loan before he defaults, and hide the proceeds. While this is
potentially actionable, inefficiency of the legal system discourages going after borrowers. The result is that most
commercial banks have a lot of non-performing assets (estimated to be as much as 10% of total assets) despite
the fact that most of their lending is in the form of working capital loans.
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It is therefore not surprising that the existing rules in India leave little room for independent decision-making.
In particular, projections of future profits (an area where judgement tends to be important) have no place in the
decision. Maximum permissible bank finance is calculated as a percentage of projected sales. In turn, the guideline
is that projected sales should not exceed current sales plus 15%.
33Berger et al. (2001) show that in the US, the increasing concentration in banking after deregulation, has
significantly reduced, access to credit for small firms.
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But there are many other countries with similar dysfunctionalities where we would expect the
same kinds of results to apply.
It is therefore important not to lose track of policy changes that would make it easier to
lend to small firms in developing countries by focussing entirely on the privatization issue.
In particular, it may help to set up special courts for the speedy disposition of default cases
(some states in India are experimenting with this model, and Visaria (2006) finds that this debt
recovery tribunals do reduce default and interest rates charged on loans). It is also important
to improve the system of recording titles to, and liens on, property, to avoid the possibility that
the same asset may be used to secure multiple loans. Severe punishments for those involved in
asset-stripping and other types of fraud will also make lenders more forthcoming.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
levels Change! t)-(l-l)
entire sample change in loans
not missing
entire sample
(1) (2)
change in loans
not missing
(3) (4)
PANEL A: LOANS AND INTEREST RATES
working capital
loan (this bank)
87.66
(237.04)
1226
96.29
(258.2)
928
10.29
(59.92)
966
7.46
(55.32)
928
log(working capital
loan) (this bank)
3.39
(1.47)
1208
3.44
(1.5)
928
0.07
(.24)
928
0.07
(.24)
928
working capital
loans (all banks)
87
(246)
1102
97
(273)
807
10
(69)
842
7
(67)
807
log(working capital loans)
(all banks)
3.36
(1.48)
1085
3.41
(1.51)
807
0.06
(.26)
807
0.06
(.26)
807
other bank loans
positive
0.0120
(.11)
1748
0.004
(.06)
807
0.0000
(.14)
1748
-0.007
(.1)
807
other bank loans
(level)
1.65
(25.86)
1748
2.23
(36.54)
807
0.00
(22.54)
1748
-0.62
(30.9)
807
interest rate 15.75
(1.63)
1142
15.58
(1.59)
896
-0.32
(.94)
876
-0.32
(.94)
856
log(interest rate) 2.75
(.18)
1142
2.74
(.19)
896
-0.02
(.16)
878
-0.02
(.17)
858
Notes:
1
-Columns 1 and 2 present the mean level of each variable, with the standard error in parentheses
and the number of observations on the third line.
2-Columns 3 and 4 present the mean change in each variable, with the standard error in parentheses
and the number of observations on the third line.
3. All Values are expressed in current Rs.10,000.
Table 1 (continued) Descriptive statistics
levels Change t-t-1
entire sample change in loans entire sample i;hange in loans
not missing not missing
(I)' (2) (3) (4)
PANEL B: CREDIT UTILIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
account reaches the 0.72 0.69 -0.01 -0.01
limit (.45) (.46) (.44) (.44)
522 380 247 233
log(tumover/limit) 2.15 2.15 0.09 0.11
(.95) (.96) (.72) (.71)
384 308 170 167
Sales 709.33 820.70 108.64 86.66
(2487.24) (2714.88) (653.62) (598.64)
1259 746 1041 739
log(sales) 5.49 5.64 0.17 0.09
(1.44) (1.46) (.53) (.45)
1248 740 1029 732
log(sales/Ioan ratio) 2.19 2.18 -0.01 0.02
(.89) (.87) (.53) (.49)
1004 740 751 732
net profit 36.51 42.49 6.08 4.04
(214.11) (237.16) (61.32) (58.3)
1259 747 1043 741
log( costs) 5.45 5.61 5.45 5.61
* (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45)
1245 739 1245 739
Notes:
1
-Columns 1 and 2 present the mean level of each variable, with the standard error in parentheses
and the number of observations on the third line.
2-Columns 3 and 4 present the mean change in each variable, with the standard error in parentheses
and the number of observations on the third line.
3. All Values are expressed in current Rs. 10,000.
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Table 4: Average change in limit
Years
1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2002
Firm's category
A. Average change in limit
small 0.110 0.075 0.070
(.021) (.013) (.014)
medium 0.040 0.093 0.011
(.032) (.030) (.025)
biggest 0.093 0.147 0.000
(.064) (.040) (.031)
B. Proportion of cases where limlit was not ch,anged
small 0.701 0.701 0.724
(.043) (.031) (.027)
medium 0.667 0.608 0.798
(.088) (.055) (.040)
biggest 0.625 0.692 0.769
(.183) (.075) (.053)
C. Average change in limit, conditional on change
small 0.366 0.252 0.253
(.045) (.035) (.045)
medium
biggest
0.119 0.237 0.053
(.093) (.068) (.124)
0.248 0.479 -0.002
(.137) (.062) (.138)
Notes:
1-The first row of each panel presentsthe average of log(working capital limit granted
at date t)-log(working capital limit granted at date t-1).
2-Standard errors in parentheses below the average.
3-Number of observations in the third row of each panel.
4-"Small firms" are firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs 6.5 million .
"Medium firms" are firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs 6.5 million.
and below Rs 10 million. "Biggest firms" are firms with investment in plant and machinery
above Rs 10 million.
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Table 7: Credit constraints: Effect of the reform on sales, sales to loan ratios, and profits (OLS regressions)
Dependent variables
Log(sales),-log(sales),.| log(sales/Ioans),
Complete Sample Sample without substitution log(sales/loans),_.
Log( costs),
-log(cost),.,
Log( profit),
-log(profit),..
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (3) (4) (5)
A. t= 1997-2000
1. Sample with Changes in limit
post*big 0.194
(.106)
152
2. Sample without Change in limit
post*big 0.007
(.074)
301
3. Whole sample
post*big 0.071
(.068)
453
B.t=l 999-2002
1 Sample with Changes in limit
post2*biggest -0.403
(.207)
168
2. Sample without Change in limit
post2*biggest ' -0.092
(.108)
401
3. Whole sample
post2*biggest -0.143
(.111)
569
0.168 -0.065 0.187
(.118) (.104) (.097)
136 152 151
0.022 0.007 0.005
(.081) (.074) (.064)
285 301 301
0.071 -0.016 0.068
(.069) (.075) (.055)
421 453 452
-0.387 0.143 -0.374
(.196) (.206) (.279)
150 169 168
-0.045 -0.092 -0.048
(.128) (.108) (.086)
380 401 399
-0.113 -0.016 -0.101
(.134) (.162) (.094)
530 570 567
0.538
(.281)
141
0.280
(.473)
250
0.316
(.368)
391
-0.923
(.639)
151
0.170
(.56)
321
-0.253
(.496)
472
Notes:
1. Each panel is a separate regression. Each column presents a regression of column heading on the variables listed in each panel
2. The dummy "post" is equal to 1 in years 1999 and 2000, zero otherwise.
The dummy "post2" is equal to 1 in years 2001-2002 zero otherwise.
3. The dummy "big" is equal to 1 for firms with investment in plant and machinery larger than Rs 6.5 million, zero otherwise.
The dummy "biggest" is equal to 1 for firms with investment in plant and machinery larger than Rs 10 million.
4-Standard errors (corrected for clustering at the sector level) are in parentheses below the coefficient.
5-In addition from coefficient displayed, the regressions in panels A1-A3 include a dummy for post and a dummy for big.
5-In addition from coefficient displayed, the regressions in panels BI-B3 include a dummy for post2 and a dummy for biggest.
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